Myanmar and Asean

I thought the commentary piece by Verghese Matthews (ST 23 May; 21) lends a good deal of insight into some issues concerning Myanmar.


"However, what is sometimes missed out is that the ASEAN divide is more than merely economic or developmental. The Myanmar controversy has highlighted a difference in the mindset within the grouping, leading maybe even to a thin fissure line, with Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam demonstrating a greater empathy for Myanmar than the other member countries.

Here again, this is neither surprising nor can be wished away quickly given the historical baggage of the four countires and the difficulties they have individually encountered in warding of what they perceive to be foreign interference in their internal affairs.

No doubt, like the rest of Asean, the CLMV countries recognised the dilemma faced if Myanmar assumes the chairmanship next year: It will not be helpful for Asean.

At the same time, if Myanmar is forced out of the chairmanship against its will, it would also not be a desired outcome and would be a "bad precedent".

However, despite these practical considerations, the CLMV countries are particularly outraged by external pressure (read Western governments) now disingenuously using the back door of Asean's rotating chairmanship to pursue an objective in Myanmar.

What hitherto could not be achieved by external pressure against an individual member country would now appear possible because of a weak spot in Asean's organisational structure.

It was, therefore, not at all surprising that the well-honed survival instincts of Cambodia, Wietnam adn Laos immediately detected areas of concern and threats for themselves in what was happening to Myanmar."

- ST 23 May, "Don't push Myanmar into a corner", 21



The CLMV countries have much in common not least because they joined Asean later than the core 6, but that they have remained as authoritarian regimes to this day. Myanmar's military junta is infamously known over the world because the country has an Aung San Su Kyi who is an internationalised political figure. Western countries are not hesistant to impose punitive sanctions in part because Myanmar does not bear any immediate importance in their strategic calculations. The other perhaps equally brutal regimes, however, receive less international attention because they do not have the equivalent of an Aung San Su Kyi to magnify their undemocratic rule. Clearly cognizant of how Asean's handling of the problem of Myanmar's impending chairmanship would have significant political implications for their regimes, these countries are not surprisingly sympathetic towards Myanmar. If they sense that the rest of Asean members are quick to impose their wishes on Myanmar to achieve a political objective, they would surely reconsider the utility of the organisation. This is perhaps why the other Asean coutnries such as Malaysia expressed unhappiness initially at the lack of democratic progress by the military junta in Myanmar, but later appeared to change tack by stating that the chairmanship problem is for Myanamr to resolve. This is perhaps an explicit attempt to demonstrate that they still adhere to the non-interference principle upheld by member states in Asean. Inasmuch as the non-CLMV Asean countries want Myanmar's chairmanship not to be a stubborn hindrance in Asean's relations with the Western powers, they have to tread cautiously to ensure that the problem would not lead to internal division and paralysis.